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How Animal Science Products, Inc. Plays 
a Role in the China and U.S. 
International Relations Saga 
Tessa V. Mears* 
“How Animal Science Products, Inc. Plays a Role in the 
China and U.S. International Relations Saga” takes a look 
at a June 2018 Supreme Court decision that ruled federal 
courts are not bound to defer to a foreign government’s in-
terpretation of its own law. This paper discusses the pros 
and cons of absolute deference to foreign governments in 
these instances, in addition to examining the effectiveness 
of foreign amicus briefs in antitrust cases before the Su-
preme Court. This paper finishes with a discussion on the 
current state of international relations China and the U.S., 
with a summary of where the case leaves us today. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A foreign company wants to do business with the United 
States. It is comprised of wise business-persons, and it knows that 
the U.S. market has the potential to be very lucrative. The compa-
ny enters into a contract with a U.S. company and all seems to be 
going well. In an unforeseen twist, the U.S. company sues the for-
eign company for violating American antitrust law vis-à-vis price-
fixing activities. However, the foreign company believes it can get 
“off the hook” because the U.S. law it is accused of violating is in 
direct conflict with a law of its own country that it is forced to 
obey. A government agency from its own country even submits an 
amicus brief on its behalf to support the company’s defense that its 
foreign law requires price-fixing. Unbeknownst to the company, 
according to a recent United States Supreme Court decision, U.S. 
federal courts do not have to defer to a country’s interpretation of 
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its own laws.1 What the foreign company once thought would be a 
strong defense may now be altogether meaningless. 
Foreign companies can face this exact dilemma with globaliza-
tion and foreign law.2 According to the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis, imports to the U.S. from September 2019 alone totaled $258.4 
billion.3 With the U.S. government and U.S. companies so envel-
oped in international relations and trade, the need to understand 
how foreign laws work for the context of litigation is clear. Similar 
to domestic disputes, the outcome of a case can hinge on the deci-
sion of which law to apply.4 Conducting international business typ-
ically requires a common understanding in order to contract.5 Un-
fortunately, the federal courts’ approach to interpreting interna-
tional law has been widely inconsistent. When issues arise causing 
courts to intervene, it is unpredictable how a federal court will 
choose to rely on information from a foreign government’s inter-
pretation of its own laws. 
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Animal 
Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
sought to provide guidance to an area of the law lacking direction.6 
The issue the Court considered was: “[w]hen foreign law is rele-
vant to a case instituted in a federal court, and the foreign govern-
ment whose law is in contention submits an official statement on 
the meaning and interpretation of its domestic law, may the federal 
court look beyond that official statement?”7 
                                                                                                             
 1 See infra Part III; Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. 
Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018). 
 2 For the purposes of this paper, “foreign law” will refer to the law of an-
other country. This is to be distinguished from international law, which is the 
law that is binding on all nations. 
 3 Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Trade in Goods and Ser-
vices, https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/us-international-trade-goods-and-services
-september-2019 (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
 4 See Carolyn B. Lamm & K. Elizabeth Tang, Rule 44.1 and Proof of For-
eign Law in Federal Court, 30 LITIG. 31, 32 (2003). 
 5 See generally Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of 
Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Under-
standing, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 889 (2011). 
 6 See generally Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. 
Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018). 
 7 Id. 
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The Court held that a federal court should practice “respectful 
consideration” when considering a foreign government’s interpre-
tation of its own laws, but it is not bound to defer to a foreign gov-
ernment’s interpretation of its own laws when deciding legal issues 
that involve foreign law.8 The Court used language from Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 (“FRCP 44.1”) to support its reason-
ing, looking to the Advisory Committee Notes of this rule, which 
says that the court “may engage in its own research and consider 
any relevant material thus found.”9 
The Chinese defendants in Animal Science Products, Inc. were 
accused of violating U.S. antitrust laws.10 U.S. antitrust enforce-
ment is concerned with foreign actions that have a significant and 
purposeful effect on the United States.11 A uniform standard for 
foreign government deference in antitrust law had been long 
awaited.12 
This note will analyze both the social and political climate that 
led up to the Animal Science Products, Inc. decision, as well as the 
effects it will have on us all. Part II will discuss the history of 
FRCP 44.1 and the significance of its 1966 amendment. Part III 
will discuss the procedural history and circumstances leading up to 
the Animal Science Products, Inc. case. Part IV will examine the 
reaction of foreign amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, as well as 
the reasons in favor and in opposition of deference to foreign gov-
ernments’ interpretation of their own laws. Part V will discuss the 
recent trade talks with China with the U.S., and the longstanding 
complicated relationships of these two countries to provide con-
text. Finally, Part VI will bring together the takeaways from Ani-
mal Science Products, Inc. and where the decision leaves us today. 
                                                                                                             
 8 Id. 
 9 This means courts can rely on any research they choose, whether or not it 
was submitted by the parties. Id. at 1869-70 (citing Advisory Committee’s 1966 
Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 44.1, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 892). 
 10 Id. at 1870. 
 11 See John Deq. Briggs, Schrödinger’s Cat and Extraterritoriality, 29 
ANTITRUST 79, 79 (2014). 
 12 See id. at 84. 
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II. PRIOR LAW AND PERSPECTIVE 
A. The Important Role of FRCP 44.1 for Foreign Law 
From the time of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s adop-
tion until 1966, the rules did not address the requirement of inter-
preting foreign law.13 From 1938 to 1996, the majority of federal 
courts reviewed foreign laws as facts.14 This made it difficult to 
prevail on a motion for summary judgment because opposing par-
ties only needed to present a dispute regarding the substance of the 
foreign law.15 Further, the pre-1966 FRCP 44.1 required appellate 
courts to view disputes of foreign law under the “clearly errone-
ous” standard, which meant they were effectively closed off from 
reviewing trial court rulings in application of foreign law.16 
In 1966, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
changed FRCP 44.1 to view foreign law as a question of law in-
stead of fact.17 The new FRCP 44.1 states: 
A party who intends to raise an issue about a for-
eign country’s law must give notice by a pleading 
or other writing. In determining foreign law, the 
court may consider any relevant material or source, 
including testimony, whether or not submitted by a 
party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. The court’s determination must be treated as 
a ruling on a question of law.18 
With this update to the rule came two major effects: (1) federal 
courts were no longer restricted on the research they could conduct 
when faced with questions of foreign law, and (2) federal courts no 
longer had to rely on the Federal Rules of Evidence when consid-
                                                                                                             
 13 Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the Fact Approach to Determin-
ing Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 
653 (1967). 
 14 See Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1956) 
(“[t]he general federal rule is that the ‘law’ of a foreign country is a fact which 
must be proved.”); Miller, supra note 13, at 653-54. 
 15 See Proof of Foreign Law after Four Decades with Rule 44.1 FRCP AND 
CPLR 4511, 61 REC. ASS’N. CITY N.Y. 49, 50 (2006). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Lamm & Tang, supra note 4, at 31. 
 18 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. 
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ering information about foreign law.19 In other words, courts could 
now view any relevant materials when making their determination 
on foreign laws. This discretion allows the judge to consider sever-
al critical factors in determining an issue of foreign law, including: 
significance of foreign law to the case, intricacy of the foreign-law 
question, and the best way to fairly cater to the needs of both par-
ties.20 
The scope of evidence admissible for applying and interpreting 
foreign law widened dramatically.21 Despite the update to the 
Rules (because the Rules left the issue of what evidence to consid-
er open open), courts continue to use diverse approaches when ad-
dressing a question of foreign law.22 This diversity is problematic 
because courts strive to achieve solidarity in decision making, so it 
is no surprise that this issue reached the United States Supreme 
Court in Animal Science Products, Inc.23 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND CASE SUMMARY 
This dispute began in 2005 between Chinese sellers of Vitamin 
C and American buyers of this product.24 The U.S. buyers filed a 
                                                                                                             
 19 Lamm & Tang, supra note 4, at 31. 
 20 Miller, supra note 13, at 660. 
 21 For example, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have allowed unauthenticat-
ed copies and translations of foreign law. See Forzley v. AVCO Corp. Elec. 
Div., 826 F.2d 974, 979 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987); Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos 
Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493, 497 n.11 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 22 Compare Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F3d 694, 
707 (5th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that “domestic policy should have priority over 
comity and that a court should not be compelled to protect foreign interests over 
interests of the forum state”), and Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that “[c]omity cannot be the source 
of a disability that prevents a district court from having the power to address 
wrongdoing that impacts a domestic court . . . comity must yield to domestic 
policy”) with Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on Mar. 
16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A court of the United States 
owes substantial deference to the construction France places on its domestic 
law.”). 
 23 Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 
1865 (2018). 
 24 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 
2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei 
Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018). 
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class-action lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York against four Chinese sellers, alleging that the Chinese 
sellers agreed to both price-fixing and quantity-fixing in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.25 The Chinese sellers filed a mo-
tion to dismiss based on their defense that the price-and-quantity-
fixing were mandatory under Chinese law.26 The Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (“the Chinese gov-
ernment”) submitted an amicus brief to the court asserting that (1) 
the Chinese sellers’ defense was accurate, and (2) it was the ad-
ministrative agency responsible for regulating trade in China.27 
The U.S. buyers presented three important pieces of evidence 
in response: (1) a publication that revealed that the Chinese sellers 
had agreed to fix the price and quantity of Vitamin C, (2) expert 
testimony, and (3) pointed out that the Chinese sellers did not 
name any particular law or regulation that required this business 
conduct.28 The U.S. buyers specifically pointed to China’s state-
ment to the World Trade Organization that it concluded its regula-
tion of Vitamin C exports in 2002.29 In light of FRCP 44.1, the 
district court ruled that a foreign government’s interpretation of its 
law does not automatically qualify for absolute and conclusive 
deference and that further investigation is permitted.30 Therefore, 
the district court looked beyond the interpretation of law proffered 
by the Chinese government and found that its government did not 
compel the price-fixing and quantity-fixing activities of the Chi-
nese suppliers.31 The district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
and it later denied the Chinese suppliers’ motion for summary 
judgment.32 
                                                                                                             
 25 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008), rev’d, 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 
201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018). 
 26 Id. at 548. 
 27 Id. at 552. 
 28 Id. at 554-55. 
 29 Id. at 549. 
 30 Id. at 556. 
 31 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
 32 Id. at 560; In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 566-67 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
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The district court’s decision was then reversed by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals.33 The Second Circuit reasoned that when 
a foreign government provides an official statement that interprets 
its contested law, federal courts are “bound to defer” to the foreign 
government’s interpretation as long as the interpretation is reason-
able.34 The court solely relied on the amicus brief submitted by the 
Chinese government.35 Because of this high level of deference, the 
appellate court did not reach the other evidence presented by the 
American buyers at the district court—most notably, the Chinese 
government’s failure to point to a specific law or regulation that 
required the Chinese suppliers to engage in price-fixing and quan-
tity-fixing. Instead, the court was concerned with principles of in-
ternational comity and reciprocity in reaching its decision.36 The 
appellate court began its analysis with the first factor of the comity 
balancing test: the degree of conflict with foreign law.37 Much like 
the district court had done, the appellate court centered its analysis 
on FRCP 44.1; however, the appellate court determined that mere-
ly because FRCP 44.1 tells a court what it can review when inter-
preting foreign law, does not mean it tells a court how it must ex-
amine the foreign law.38 Keeping principles of international comity 
                                                                                                             
 33 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2016), vacat-
ed and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018). 
 34 Id. at 189. 
 35 Id. at 189-190. 
 36 Id. at 184. 
 37 Id.; The list of internal comity factors are (1) Degree of conflict with 
foreign law or policy; (2) Nationality of the parties, locations or principal places 
of business of corporations; (3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of 
conduct here as compared with conduct abroad; (4) The extent to which en-
forcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the availability 
of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; (5) Existence of intent 
to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; (6) Possible effect 
upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) If 
relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to 
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by 
both countries; (8) Whether the court can make its order effective; (9) Whether 
an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign 
nation under similar circumstances; and (10) Whether a treaty with the affected 
nations has addressed the issue. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 
595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 38 Id. at 187. 
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in mind, the appellate court reasoned that the international comity 
factors favor refraining from further intervention. Ultimately, 
“China’s strong interest in its protectionist economic policies,” 
outweighed any antitrust enforcement interests of the United 
States.39 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, in June of 2018, Justice Gins-
burg delivered the opinion of an unanimous Court in favor of the 
American buyers.40 The Court reasoned that the Second Circuit 
was incorrect to find that American courts are bound to defer to a 
foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws, and empha-
sized that FRCP 44.1 does not provide a level of deference as 
guidance for these matters.41 Further, Justice Ginsburg wrote that 
consideration of a foreign government’s interpretation of its own 
laws must be on a case-by-case basis—rather than a bright-line 
rule.42 Justice Ginsburg noted that some appropriate considerations 
for evaluating a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law 
include, “the statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its 
context and purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; 
the role and authority of the entity or official offering the state-
ment; and the statement’s consistency with the foreign govern-
ment’s past positions.”43 These considerations center on the quality 
and the trustworthiness of the statement, rather than pure deference 
alone. Further, Justice Ginsburg noted that FRCP 44.1 logically 
requires a court to consider the foreign law as a “question of law,” 
not of fact.44 Therefore, the Court should not be restricted on the 
evidence it reviews, and it should consider all relevant evidence in 
making its determination of the foreign law. Because the Court 
determined that the Chinese government’s statement was not 
bound to absolute deference, it remanded the case for consideration 
of relevant materials.45 
                                                                                                             
 39 Animal Sci. Products Inc., 837 F.3d at 194. 
 40 Animal Sci. Products Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 
1865, 1872 (2018). 
 41 Id. at 1873 (“As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, Rule 44.1 does 
not address the weight a federal court determining foreign law should give to the 
views presented by the foreign government.”). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1868. 
 44 Id. at 1869. 
 45 Id. at 1875. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. A Brief History of Foreign Government Amicus Briefs in 
U.S. Federal Court, with a Special Focus on China 
This section will provide a brief history into how amicus briefs 
began, how they have changed overtime, and China’s appearance 
as amicus in antitrust actions in the Supreme Court. 
Amicus briefs, also known as “friend of the court” briefs, have 
evolved overtime to what we know today.46 The concept originated 
in Roman Law and pre-eighteenth century England.47 Back then, 
an amicus brief was actually an in-court attorney that represented 
neither party, whose sole presence was to engage in “oral shepard-
izing,” i.e. inform the judge of any unknown case law.48 In 1821, 
the first amicus in U.S. court was Henry Clay in Green v. Biddle.49 
This was a land dispute case in which Clay personally appeared 
before the Supreme Court to act as an amicus on behalf of non-
party landowners.50 The case, decided in 1823, marks the begin-
ning of the amicus brief transformation from an unbiased lawyer 
speaking on the issue, to advocacy on behalf of a party.51 
The evolution of amicus briefs and the effects of globalization 
have led to a greater presence of foreign amicus in the Supreme 
Court.52 According to a systematic study conducted by Eichensehr 
53 on foreign governments’ amicus brief filings to the Court in 
2016, forty-six countries have filed or signed amicus briefs in mer-
it cases in the past four decades.54 Merit briefs involve substantive 
legal questions, like the brief submitted by the Ministry in Animal 
                                                                                                             
 46 Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 
1757, 1765–68 (2014). 
 47 Id. at 1765. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1766; Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 17 (1823). 
 50 Green, 21 U.S. at 17 (In this case, Clay served both as an arm of the court 
and as a representative for the non-party landowners.). 
 51 See Larsen, supra note 46, at 1766. 
 52 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 
102 VA. L. REV. 289, 306 (2016). 
 53 Kristen Eichensehr was a visiting Assistant Professor at UCLA School of 
Law when she conducted this study. 
 54 Id. 
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Science Products, Inc.55 Typically, countries with well-established 
trade relationships with the U.S. file amicus briefs at the highest 
rates in U.S. court. For example, the United Kingdom has filed the 
highest amount of merit briefs in the past forty years.56 From the 
sixty-eight foreign sovereign amicus briefs filed on the merits be-
tween 1978 to 2013, 44% address the foreign government’s do-
mestic laws.57 
While filing rates can tell us why foreign governments submit 
amicus briefs, citation rates show us the weight the Court gives to 
these briefs. From the thirty-nine merits cases involving at least 
one foreign amicus brief since 1978, Eichensehr found that 44% 
were cited at least once in the opinion of the case.58 This number 
proves to be even more significant when compared to Supreme 
Court cites of other institutional entities. In 2000, Kearney and 
Merrill59 conducted a study that involved the Court’s citation rates 
of the ACLU and the AFL-CIO from 1986 to 1995.60 The study 
found that, during this time period, the Court cited 4.86% of briefs 
submitted by the ACLU and 9.72% of briefs submitted by the 
AFL-CIO.61 During this same time period, the Court cited 55% of 
amicus briefs submitted by foreign governments.62 
Animal Science Products, Inc. is a critical case to examine be-
cause it marks the first time the Chinese government has submitted 
an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in a proceeding in which one 
of the parties is from its own country.63 The top five countries who 
                                                                                                             
 55 See Id. at 306; Brief of Amicus Curiae Ministry of Commerce of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in Support of Respondents, Animal Sci. Products, Inc. 
v. Hebei Welcome Pharm Co. Ltd.,138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220), 2018 
WL 1666001. 
 56 See Eichensehr, supra note 52. 
 57 Id. at 318. 
 58 Id. at 320-21. 
 59 Kearney was an Assistant Professor of Law at Marquette University when 
he conducted this study. He now serves as the Dean of this law school. Merrill 
was a John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern University when he 
conducted this study. He is now a Professor of Law at Yale University. 
 60 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 761 (2000). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 322. 
 63 This determination was made by cross-referencing the LexisNexis and 
Westlaw Supreme Court briefs databases. 
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file amicus briefs to the Court are the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Mexico, Switzerland, and Japan.64 China, despite being a top trad-
ing partner to the United States, is noticeably absent from the list 
of the top five filers of amicus briefs.65 
The only other instance the Chinese government submitted an 
amicus brief to the Supreme Court was in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. 
v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l. 66 That case involved a bid for a 
construction company in which a New Jersey-based Nigerian com-
pany was accused of bribing the Nigerian government in order to 
be awarded the construction contract.67 A bidder that was not 
awarded the contract sued the winning company after learning 
about a 20% commission it paid to two Panamanian “entities” for 
aiding the successful bidder in securing the contract.68 China sub-
mitted a brief to urge the Court to stay out of this matter.69 
In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., China—although not directly in-
volved in that case—submitted an amicus brief for two main rea-
sons: (1) China is a top trading partner of the United States, so it is 
itself no stranger to being called into proceedings here and recog-
nizes the function of the Act of State doctrine in preventing U.S. 
courts from having to decide pending claims that have the potential 
to harm foreign relations; and (2) China’s distress regarding the 
effects of allowing unsuccessful bidders to call into question a for-
eign government’s decision to contract by claiming corrupt activi-
ties in the selection process.70 The two other amicus briefs submit-
                                                                                                             
 64 Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 307 (European Union, placed second, is 
removed from the list above because it is a union of 28-member countries, as it 
refers to itself on its official website: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu_en.). 
 65 International Trade Administration, https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build
/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2019). 
 66 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400 
(1990). 
 67 Id. at 401. 
 68 Id. at 402. 
 69 Brief of the Republic of China as Amicus Curiae, W.S. Kirkpatrick & 
Co.v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (No.87-2066), 1989 
WL 1127463. 
 70 See id; The Act of State doctrine prevents federal courts from invalidating 
the official act of a foreign sovereign involving activities within its own territo-
ry. Id. at 405. 
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ted in this case were by the American Bar Association and the 
United States Department of Justice.71 It is interesting to note that 
the Court’s opinion only directly addresses the amicus brief of the 
Department of Justice.72 
Ultimately, the Court was not convinced by China’s argument 
that the Act of State doctrine must preclude its involvement in the 
case.73 The Court reasoned that the Act of State doctrine does not 
create an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass 
foreign governments.74 Rather, it requires courts to deem the acts 
of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions valid.75 
Because the validity of the foreign sovereign act was not at issue in 
the case, the Act of State doctrine was not applicable.76 
There are a couple important distinctions to note between W.S. 
Kirkpatrick & Co. and Animal Science Products, Inc. First, Nigeria 
acknowledged that Nigerian law forbids the procurement and ac-
ceptance of bribes for government contracts.77 At the center of dis-
pute in Animal Science Products, Inc. was whether Chinese law 
actually required the Chinese suppliers to participate in price and 
quantity fixing.78 Second, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. did not involve a 
foreign governments’ interpretation of its own law, so its words 
likely did not carry as much weight as the amicus brief in Animal 
Science Products, Inc. 
B.  Problems Posed by U.S. Courts Facing Issues of Foreign 
Law 
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of exercis-
ing caution to remain objective in the face of other, perhaps unfa-
                                                                                                             
 71 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association, W.S. Kirkpat-
rick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (No.87-2066), 
1989 WL 1127469; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, W.S. Kirkpat-
rick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (No.87-2066), 
1988 WL 1026122. 
 72 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co, 493 U.S. at 408. 
 73 Id. at 401. 
 74 See id. at 409-10. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. at 406. 
 78 Animal Sci. Products Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 
1865, 1870 (2018). 
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miliar, cultures and societies.79 Justice Kennedy wrote in Abbott v. 
Abbott that “[j]udges must strive always to avoid a common ten-
dency to prefer their own society and culture, a tendency that ought 
not interfere with objective consideration . . . .” 80 Although the 
judiciary is an objective branch, it would only be natural for the 
humans that comprise it to have certain preconceived notions of 
unfamiliar territory. This raises a couple thought-provoking ques-
tions: (1) is the likelihood of foreign amicius success at least 
somewhat determined by its country of origin, and (2) what diffi-
culties do courts encounter when interpreting foreign law? 
In civil law jurisdictions, legal codes take precedent to judicial 
decision when it comes to interpreting law.81 In Curley v. AMR 
Corp., the Second Circuit acknowledged that the court had a duty 
to consider how Mexican courts interpret their own laws because 
Mexican law is so different from New York state law.82 Mexico is 
a civil law jurisdiction and these jurisdictions depart greatly from 
our legal traditions.83 The Second Circuit had to answer the ques-
tion of whether the defendant met the standard for illicit action or 
against “good customs and habits” of Mexico.84 This case presents 
the dilemma of U.S. courts needing to know societal norms to 
make a ruling. In instances like these, deferring to amicus briefs 
may be the only way for them to know this information. 
Developing countries present a very different obstacle. Often-
times, recordings of their laws are hard to find—making it almost 
impossible to concretely interpret the relevant law. 85 It is only the 
ability of courts to conduct their own investigations that can truly 
lead to the best results. If a federal court is presented with a case 
involving a contested foreign law of a developing country, and the 
                                                                                                             
 79 See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (child custody dispute in-
volving aspects of Chilean law). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Berkeley Law School, The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CommonLawCivil
LawTraditions.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
 82 Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 83 Comm. on Int’l Commercial Disputes, Proof of Foreign Law after Four 
Decades with Rule 44.1 FRCP and CPLR 4511, 61 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 
49, 56 (2006). 
 84 Curley, 153 F.3d at 15. 
 85 Comm. on Int’l Commercial Disputes, supra note 83, at 56. 
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foreign government submitted an amicus brief to explain the con-
test law, courts would be wholly blocked from meaningful investi-
gation into the issues of the case. Just because the interpretation 
would be meaningful, the court would have to oblige the foreign 
sovereign’s statement. This in turn could lead to a confusion of the 
issues and misapplication of law. 
With Animal Science Products, Inc., the need to understand the 
differences in legal and societal norms is no different. The defer-
ence that the Second Circuit demonstrated can be especially im-
portant where the legal system is so different. According to the 
Chinese government in this case, Chinese law requires price-
fixing.86 Were this to be true, this would be the exact opposite of 
what the American government requires.87 It is no question that the 
differences in the way China and the United States conduct busi-
ness are massive. For example, China boasts a state-run news in-
dustry and policy bank.88 Additionally, China influences its tech 
market. The Chinese government released the “Made in China 
2025” Key Area Technology Roadmap (Made in China 
Roadmap).89 This roadmap sets clear market share targets domesti-
cally and globally to be met by Chinese producers in a number of 
high-tech industries.90 As stated previously, the second interna-
tional comity factor accounts for “nationality of the parties, loca-
tions or principal places of business of corporations.”91 This factor 
suggests that courts may need to treat parties differently based up-
on where they are from. 
                                                                                                             
 86 Animal Sci. Products Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 
1865, 1870 (2018) (stating that Chinese sellers moved to dismiss the U. S. pur-
chasers’ complaint on the ground that Chinese law required them to fix the price 
and quantity of vitamin C exports). 
 87 Id. at 1867 (explaining that the Chinese sellers engaged in price-fixing 
activity in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 88 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF 
THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED 
TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION 
UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018), 90-92. 
 89 Id. at 10. 
 90 Id. at 15. 
 91 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2016), vacat-
ed and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018). 
200 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:185 
 
This begs the question, would this case have turned out differ-
ently if the amicus brief and the defendants were from another 
country more closely related to the U.S. legal system? Could it be 
that the Supreme Court acted in a way that Justice Kennedy cau-
tioned against in Abbott?92 To answer this question, we must first 
look at antitrust jurisprudence in the Supreme Court where foreign 
governments have submitted briefs. To do this investigation, I 
cross-referenced the Supreme Court databases on Westlaw and 
LexisNexis to analyze the outcomes of amicus briefs submitted by 
the United States top trading partners93 in antitrust lawsuits where 
an organization or corporation from its country was a defendant. 
Let us begin with the highest filer of amicus briefs to the Su-
preme Court: the United Kingdom.94 For the United Kingdom, the 
only brief on these databases that fits this description comes from 
the case Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California.95 Plaintiffs in that 
case alleged that domestic members of the insurance industry col-
luded with domestic and foreign insurers to obtain changes in in-
surance coverage, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.96 
In a brief submitted by the United Kingdom, the government 
pleaded with the Court to refrain from finding liability on part of 
the petitioners because application of U.S. antitrust law would pro-
duce major conflict with English law and policy.97 The amicus 
brief raised the issue of “mutual respect between close allies and 
deference to principles of international law and comity,” and it 
further asserted that the appellate court decision disregarded these 
principles by exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this 
claim.98 Ultimately, the Court chose to exercise jurisdiction be-
                                                                                                             
 92 See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (stating that “[j]udges must 
strive always to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and cul-
ture, a tendency that ought not interfere with objective consideration “ when 
deciding cases). 
 93 The top trading partners are Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom. International Trade Administration, supra note 65. 
 94 See Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 307. 
 95 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 96 Id. at 770-71. 
 97 See Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (No. 
91-1129), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 774 *. 
 98 Id. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 201 
 
cause no direct conflict of the laws existed.99 The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took 
place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States anti-
trust laws,” even where the foreign state has a strong policy to 
permit or encourage such conduct.100 The defendants could comply 
with both laws, and thus were held liable.101 
For Japan, only one case falls into this category: F Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.102 That case involved several Jap-
anese companies accused of partaking in an international cartel to 
fix prices and apportion markets for bulk vitamin sales throughout 
U.S. markets.103 Similar to Animal Science Products, Inc., the 
plaintiffs in the case were purchasers of vitamins in foreign mar-
kets.104 The Court’s opinion centered around whether the excep-
tions of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
(“FTAIA”) apply to the Japanese companies’ activity.105 The 
FTAIA states that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct 
involving trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations”; unless, the 
conduct considerably harms American imports, domestic com-
merce, or exports.106 The Japanese government’s brief pleaded the 
Court to maintain principles of comity, stating that that allowing 
foreign purchasers to claim damages for solely foreign conduct 
damages the imperative principles of comity.107 The Court held 
that because the plaintiff’s harm from the alleged price-fixing ac-
tivity relied entirely on “independent foreign harm,” the antitrust 
laws of the United States should not apply.108 This case was ulti-
                                                                                                             
 99 Hartford Fire Ins. Co, 509 U.S. at 799 (citing Restatement (Third) For-
eign Relations Law § 415) (stating no conflict where a person can comply with 
both laws). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 103 Id. at 159. 
 104 Id. at 159. 
 105 See id. at 158-59. 
 106 Id. at 161. 
 107 See Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) 
(No. 03-724), 2004 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 106 *. 
 108 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 166-67. 
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mately remanded to address an argument not reached by the appel-
late court.109 
According to a search of the Westlaw and LexisNexis Supreme 
Court Brief databases, Mexico has never filed an amicus brief in an 
antitrust suit on behalf of parties from its country to the Supreme 
Court. The only amicus brief that Canada has filed in an antitrust 
suit on behalf of parties from its country to the Supreme Court was 
an amicus brief for writ of certiorari, which was ultimately de-
nied.110 From the case law, a pattern emerges. In both Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. (the antitrust suit involving insurers from the United 
Kingdom) and F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. (the antitrust suit in-
volving Japanese companies), the Court set aside the arguments 
raised in the foreign amicus briefs to adhere to principles of inter-
national comity, and chose instead to rule in favor of the plaintiffs 
and to enforce U.S. law.111 
C.  Deference to a Foreign Government’s Interpretation of its 
Own Laws 
This section will discuss my perspective on the United States 
Supreme Court’s ruling that federal courts are not bound to defer 
to a country’s interpretation of its own law. It will contain an in-
depth discussion into the pros and cons of extending absolute def-
erence to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws. 
The discussion will include the most contested principles from the 
Eastern District of New York, the Second Circuit, and United 
States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court wrote that when interpreting foreign law, 
the appropriate weight of deference will “depend on the circum-
stances.”112 As mentioned earlier, these circumstances include the 
“statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and 
                                                                                                             
 109 Id. at 175. 
 110 See Brief for Amicus Curiae Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Prov-
ince of Saskatchewan, Canada, In Support of Petitioners, Agrium, Inc. v. Minn-
Chem, Inc., 570 U.S. 935 (2013), (No. 12-650), 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
5449 *; Agrium Inc. v. Minn-Chem, Inc., 570 U.S. 935 (2013). 
 111 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993); F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 166-67. 
 112 Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 
1865, 1868 (2018). 
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purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and 
authority of the entity or official offering the statement; and the 
statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s past posi-
tions.”113 At first glance, the question of appropriate deference may 
seem rather simple. If the U.S. wants other countries to respect 
what we have to say about our laws, we must respect what they 
have to say about their own laws, i.e. we must employ the interna-
tional comity mindset. However, dealing with the interpretation of 
foreign law is much more complex. We must strive to find the 
right balance. 
1. Why Federal Courts Should Defer 
Under Chevron deference, U.S. courts provide absolute defer-
ence to a domestic agency’s interpretations of the laws that govern 
the agency,114 so why should U.S. courts not also provide this def-
erence to a foreign government’s interpretation of laws that govern 
them? This question is something that courts have grappled with 
before. In Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France 
on Mar. 16, 1978, the Seventh Circuit deferred to a foreign gov-
ernment’s interpretation of its own law—and cited to the case that 
established Chevron deference in its opinion.115 There are several 
reasons why federal courts may want to provide a version of Chev-
ron deference to foreign governments. 
a.  Judges are not experts on foreign law 
Justice Breyer, in an article about U.S. law and global effects, 
recently highlighted that “[t]he justices are not experts on the prac-
tices of other nations”
 
and to remedy this “knowledge gap,” it is 
                                                                                                             
 113 Id. 
 114 Chevron Deference is a type of judicial deference given to an administra-
tive agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is responsible for enforc-
ing. The doctrine was established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 115 See Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on Mar. 16, 
1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A court of the United States owes 
substantial deference to the construction France places on its domestic law. 
Courts of this nation routinely accept plausible constructions of laws by the 
agencies charged with administering them. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1984).”). 
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“helpful to receive briefs from other nations.”116 Federal court is 
no stranger to foreign agencies interpreting law in U.S. court. Even 
though federal judges deal with foreign law concepts, this does not 
mean that they know everything that is important to decision-
making. These same federal judges look to amicus briefs concern-
ing domestic law, which is wrapped up in all the cultural norms 
that the judges are familiar with. Judges indisputably use amicus 
briefs to both educate themselves on a given topic and use it for 
their decision-making process. Two-thirds of the times that the 
Supreme Court cited to an amicus brief during the 2012-2013 term, 
there was no accompanying citation to support what it was writ-
ing.117 Because judges are not experts on foreign law, foreign ami-
cus assist federal courts in interpreting unfamiliar law.118 
One example of the Court’s acknowledgement of unfamiliar 
law arises in Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd..119 In this 
case, an Australian bank was accused of committing fraud in the 
trade of its shares, arising under the Section 10(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act.120 The opinion cites to an amicus brief submit-
ted by the United Kingdom to acknowledge that regulations in oth-
er countries regularly deviates from our own—including, but not 
limited to, what rises to the level of fraud and what disclosures 
need to be given.121 Because all of the activity took place off-
shores, and Section 10(b) only applies to domestic conduct, and all 
the claims took place outside the United States, the Court ultimate-
ly affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss the complaint.122 
                                                                                                             
 116 Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World: American Law and the New 
Global Realities 133 (2015). 
 117 Larsen, supra note 46, at 7. 
 118 Justice Breyer acknowledges the important role foreign amicus briefs 
play in cases involving foreign law when he writes, “[i]t is . . . helpful to receive 
briefs from other nations as well as pertinent foreign associations.” Breyer, su-
pra note 116. 
 119 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 120 Id. at 253. 
 121 Id. at 269. 
 122 Id. at 273. 
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b. To avoid tensions while simultaneously enabling 
trade and international    relations 
The global economy today requires a level of positive interna-
tional relations to thrive. Thus, declining to exercise deference to 
foreign government interpretation could send a message that is 
detrimental to international relations. It is important to consider 
exactly how international relations for the U.S. are affected when 
the Supreme Court essentially conveys that it will not trust the in-
terpretation—and ways to avoid this dilemma altogether.123 
c. To streamline the judicial process and avoid 
expensive legal experts 
One comprehensive study conducted on over 1,000 expert wit-
nesses in over 300 fields of work found that the average pay for in-
court testimony is $385/hour, with the highest reported to be 
$7,500/hour.124 Trials can last for multiple days, and this cost does 
not even consider other pre-trial needs for expert witnesses—such 
as retainer fees, hourly deposition fees, or travel expenses. Provid-
ing deference to a foreign government’s interpretations of its own 
laws eliminates all of these issues and streamlines the process. In 
Animal Science Product, Inc., there was a battle of the experts. The 
U.S. purchasers relied on an expert on Chinese law to argue that 
the defendants’ conduct was not compelled by Chinese law.125 In 
contrast, the Chinese suppliers relied on expert testimony to sup-
port its contention that the Chinese government’s interpretation of 
its own law was accurate.126 Perhaps litigation costs for clients 
could decrease if the Court deferred to foreign amicus briefs. 
Still, there is more to consider. It is important to weigh the rea-
sons federal courts should defer to a foreign governments’ inter-
pretations of its own laws against the reasons why federal courts 
should not defer, in order to be fully aware of the consequences 
their deference. 
                                                                                                             
 123 See infra Part IV, D for more on the current state international relations 
and trade with China. 
 124 Expert Witness Fees, SEAK, https://seak.com/expert-witness-fee-study/  
(last visited September 1, 2019). 
 125 See Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 
1865, 1867 (2018). 
 126 Id. at 1871. 
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2. Why Federal Courts Should Not Defer. 
Some may argue that federal courts should afford foreign gov-
ernments the same amount of deference as they do with Chevron 
deference to U.S. agencies.127 However, the theory behind Chevron 
deference would be misapplied to foreign governments for two key 
reasons. 
In contrast to foreign agencies, U.S. officials are responsible 
for appointments within domestic agencies. This gives a level of 
control over the persons in these agencies and familiarity with 
these persons. Second, these domestic agencies are governed by 
U.S. domestic laws, which federal judges are inherently more fa-
miliar with than foreign law. Although there may be benefits that 
come with deference to a foreign government’s interpretations of 
their its own law, it would be imprudent to overlook the dangers 
that accompany this approach. There are several reasons why fed-
eral courts may not choose to defer. 
a. Federal courts should be allowed to keep their 
independence 
Michael Gottlieb, attorney for the United States in Animal Sci-
ence Products, Inc., said this decision “will promote free and open 
markets, while protecting the independence of the U.S. courts.”128 
If federal courts are bound to defer to a foreign government’s in-
terpretation, then the decision-making autonomy of the judicial 
branch—the gatekeeper that enforces our nation’s laws—is greatly 
threatened. 
b. To avoid the danger in ignoring resources, such as 
expert testimony and independent research 
There are dangers involved in accepting statements from ami-
cus briefs as true, especially in a lawsuit where there is much at 
stake. The potential for confusion of the facts and/or interpretation 
of law when all parties are domestic and bound to U.S. laws are 
                                                                                                             
 127 See generally Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 296. 
 128 Andrew Chung and Lawrence Hurley, Trump gets win at U.S. Supreme 
Court in China antitrust case, REUTERS (June 14, 2018, 7:12 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-china/supreme-court-hands-trump-
win-in-china-antitrust-case-idUSKBN1JA21B.  
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undeniable. This problem is multiplied when one side to the suit is 
foreign. The need to accurately understand the laws are even more 
important. Ignoring resources—more specifically testimony chal-
lenging the Chinese government’s statement on interpretation of its 
own law—is the reason the Supreme Court remanded Animal Sci-
ence Products, Inc.129 
Further, federal courts cannot simply take what they are given 
at face value.130 The Seventh Circuit in Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank 
of Chicago cautioned that “[a]ll too often counsel will do an inade-
quate job of researching and presenting foreign law or will attempt 
to prove it in such a partisan fashion that the court is obliged to go 
beyond their offerings.”131 Although that case involved purely do-
mestic parties, this principle applies to foreign parties as well. We 
must allow our judicial branch to fulfill its purpose in reaching 
unbiased determinations of law. This is exactly what FRCP 44.1 
allows the judiciary to do when it encounters questions of foreign 
law. 
c. To avoid countries from misrepresenting their laws 
to circumvent lawsuits 
In Animal Science Products, Inc., the Supreme Court said 
“[w]hen a foreign govt. makes conflicting statements . . . or offers 
an account in the context of litigation, there may be cause for cau-
sation in evaluating the government’s submission.”132 This is a 
gravely important consideration that many advocates for absolute 
deference overlook. In Bamberger v. Clark, the D.C. Circuit 
acknowledged that mere presence of FRCP 44.1 on the books does 
not mean that federal courts will no longer defer to a foreign agen-
                                                                                                             
 129 Justice Ginsburg noted that “[b]ecause the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the District Court was bound to defer to the Ministry’s brief, the court did 
not consider the shortcomings the District Court identified in the Ministry’s 
position.” The Court did not take a position on the correct interpretation of Chi-
nese law, but said the evidence identified by the district court were at least rele-
vant to the correct interpretation of Chinese law. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. He-
bei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1875, (2018). 
 130 See Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 
1985) (quoting 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, § 2444, p. 408). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 
1865, 1873 (2018). 
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cy’s interpretation, as long as the view is “not unreasonable or con-
trary to the plainly ascertainable intent of the legislature.”133 This 
practically mirrors the Second Circuit’s view of deference that fed-
eral courts are bound to defer to a foreign government’s interpreta-
tion of its own law when that interpretation is reasonable in Animal 
Science Products, Inc.134 However, the Second Circuit in this case 
did not include language prohibiting unreasonable interpretations 
or contradictory interpretations of the legislature. This short phrase 
at the end functions very differently from the Second Circuit’s 
view of deference to require the statement to go beyond one more 
hurdle—that is, to allow for federal courts to review legislative 
evidence in its decision-making. If we evaluate the Chinese gov-
ernment’s statement through this context, its inability to point to a 
specific law that required price-fixing could mean that its interpre-
tation would be contrary to the legislature and outside the scope of 
appropriate deference. 
Deference to foreign sovereigns is unquestionably important. 
The solution is not absolute deference to foreign amicus briefs, but 
rather, to view them critically. A court should ensure that what the 
foreign government is representing is actually indicative of the law 
it claims to interpret. Here, the Chinese government failed at the 
district court level to point to a single provision to support its con-
tention that the Chinese suppliers were forced to engage in price 
fixing.135 For this specific reason, the Court was wise to remand 
the case to allow further investigation. 
                                                                                                             
 133 Bamberger v. Clark, 390 F.2d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (reasoning that 
“in some instances at least a court will defer to an agency’s view of a question of 
law even though the court itself would not have decided the question the same 
way if it had considered the matter in the first instance—assuming of course that 
the agency’s view is not unreasonable or contrary to the plainly ascertainable 
intent of the legislature”). 
 134 See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2016), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome 
Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018). 
 135 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 554-55 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008), rev’d, 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 
201 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2018). 
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3. Can there be a balance? 
Under principles of international comity, the Second Circuit in 
Animal Science Products, Inc. was convinced by the Chinese gov-
ernment’s statements in its amicus brief. This sort of absolute def-
erence meant so much imperative evidence was never even re-
viewed to allow the court to make an informed determination 
based on all the evidence. In Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Tele-
communications Corporation, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that 
there must be a limit on principles of comity.136 The court reasoned 
that domestic policy should have priority over comity and that a 
court should not be compelled to protect foreign interests over in-
terests of the forum state.137 Because that case also involved an 
agency’s interpretation of law from its country at issue, it presents 
a helpful analogy to Animal Science Products, Inc. The Fifth Cir-
cuit ultimately ruled that Mexican agency’s interpretation did not 
deserve deference because it was not party to the suit and there was 
no evidence that this agency was given the power to interpret the 
law existed.138 
One solution to problems posed by foreign law in federal 
courts is found in the New York State Court of Appeals’ and the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales’ reciprocity system.139 The 
first of its kind, this reciprocity system was created to combat the 
expensive cost of legal experts and diminish confusion caused by 
contradictory information on foreign law.140 The participants state 
that this system is an answer to the legal system’s impediment on 
transnational trade and investment.141 When executed correctly, 
                                                                                                             
 136 Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F3d 694, 707 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 137 Id. (citing Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 
65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 138 Id. at 714-15. 
 139 The Hon. J.J. Spigelman, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, MOU Between New York and New South Wales Address (Oct. 28, 
2010), in COMPILATION OF SPEECHES DELIVERED BY THE HON. J.J. SPIGELMAN, 
AC, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NSW IN 2010. 
 140 Wilson, supra note 5, at 919. 
 141 See The Hon. J.J. Spigelman, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, MOU Between New York and New South Wales Address (Oct. 28, 
2010), in COMPILATION OF SPEECHES DELIVERED BY THE HON. J.J. SPIGELMAN, 
AC, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NSW IN 2010, at 14. 
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reciprocity systems can ensure accurate interpretation of each 
other’s laws by providing unbiased interpretations and guarantee-
ing efficiency.142 Perhaps the U.S. could benefit from a reciprocity 
system with countries that it has important trading relationships 
with. After all, China consistently ranks as the U.S.’s third highest 
trading partner.143 
V. FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS 
DECISION 
China and the U.S. have had a long-standing and complicated 
relationship with one another for many years, ranging from compe-
tition to strong business ties.144 This section will discuss the for-
eign policy implications of the Animal Science Products, Inc. Su-
preme Court decision. To provide context, it will analyze the trade 
talks with China from 2018 and ponder where Animal Science 
Products, Inc. leaves us today. 
The trade talk dance with China began in January of 2018 by 
the U.S.-issued tariffs on washing machine and solar cell imports 
from China.145 Despite the fact that the majority of imports of tar-
geted did not come from China,146 this was done to send a message 
of U.S. dominance over the global supply chain.147 The next 
month, China began a one-year anti-subsidy investigation of sor-
ghum imported into China from the U.S.148 Then in March 2018, 
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Trump issued tariffs on steel and aluminum from all countries.149 
In response, China chose to impose tariffs on three billion Ameri-
can dollars worth of imports from the U.S.150 This cat and mouse 
game continued, and remains to continue, for months—mostly 
consisting of threats to impose tariffs on even more goods from 
both sides.151 
Experts say that these tariffs are a much bigger hit to China 
than the U.S.152 For the U.S., American markets have the potential 
to disperse evenly among the different markets. If the U.S. stops 
buying from China, China would take a large hit. As one expert put 
it, “where would China’s goods go?”153 The world is watching, and 
President Trump has proved he will not shy away from engaging in 
this trade war. In September 2018, the president tweeted that the 
tariffs placed on China put the U.S. is a “strong bargaining posi-
tion,” adding that countries who do not make “fair deals with 
us . . . will be ‘[t]ariffed.’”154 
During this back and forth, the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative placed China as a top priority on its watch 
list of nations for the fourteenth consecutive year.155 This Office 
explained that both old and new intellectual property concerns 
warranted heightened focus, consisting of: trade secret theft, “ram-
pant” online piracy, and counterfeit manufacturing.156 Aside from 
these reasons, China has been notorious for hacking into technolo-
gy systems in the U.S. Supermicro, a U.S. company that manufac-
ture its motherboards in China, discovered small microchips on its 
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devices that were not supposed to be there.157 Upon further inves-
tigation, Supermicro discovered that the microchips were inserted 
during the manufacturing process in China at the direction of the 
People’s Liberation Army.158 With these microchips, the hackers 
had the ability to (1) tell the device to communicate with an anon-
ymous computer with more complex code somewhere else on the 
internet; and (2) manipulate the device to accept that code.159 This 
means that a device that once required security safeguards to ob-
tain access could entirely by-pass the device’s safeguards with the 
aid of the remote code from the microchip.160 Just to realize the 
magnitude of this hacking scandal, it is essential to note that Su-
permicro provides motherboards for top U.S. companies—
including Apple and Amazon.161 
In April 2018, the U.S. announced that it would be conducting 
an investigation into Huawei Technologies, a Chinese telecom 
manufacturer, for possible violations of sanctions against Iran.162 
Then, in December 2018, Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of Huawei, 
was arrested in Canada to determine whether she would face 
charges of fraud connected to the Iran sanctions.163 In March 2019, 
Wanzhou appeared in Canadian court; however, no final decision 
to press charges was made at that time.164 Currently, Wanzhou fac-
es 13 counts of conspiracy, fraud and obstruction in the U.S.165 Her 
hearing is set to begin in January 2020.166 
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In the spring of 2018, the U.S. placed additional tariffs on Chi-
na pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.167 These tar-
iffs were put in place in response to an investigation that revealed 
China’s technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation 
practices are unreasonable, discriminatory, and burden or restrict 
U.S. commerce.168 
The tumultuous relations with China go way beyond trade rela-
tions with the two nation’s presidents. In the 2019 National De-
fense Authorization Act, Congress forbid government agencies 
from purchasing goods from Huawei or any company that utilizes 
Huawei’s equipment.169 The Chinese tech giant responded with a 
lawsuit, suing the U.S. under the claim that this prohibition is a 
violation of the Constitution’s Bill of Attainder clause.170 Huawei 
states that this clause forbids Congress from singling out an indi-
vidual or company to issue a punishment without a trial.171 Hofstra 
University law professor Julian Ku commented that U.S. courts 
will likely not find this argument persuasive, because “doing busi-
ness with the U.S. government doesn’t seem to be a fundamental 
right, and there are reasonable grounds for Congress to act against 
                                                                                                             
 167 Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Finalizes Tariffs 
on $200 Billion of Chinese Imports in Response to China’s Unfair Trade Prac-
tices, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/
september/ustr-finalizes-tariffs-200  (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 168 The findings of the United States Trade Representative involved several 
ways that China disadvantages U.S. companies: “China uses joint venture re-
quirements, foreign investment restrictions, and administrative review and li-
censing processes to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. compa-
nies; China deprives U.S. companies of the ability to set market-based terms in 
licensing and other technology-related negotiations; China directs and unfairly 
facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and 
assets to generate large-scale technology transfer; and China conducts and sup-
ports cyber intrusions into U.S. commercial computer networks to gain unau-
thorized access to commercially valuable business information.” Id. 
 169 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 2810, 
115th Cong. (2017) (enacted), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/2810/text.  
 170 Matthew S. Schwartz, Huawei Sues After Congress Bans Purchase of Its 
Equipment, NPR (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07
/700989603/huawei-sues-u-s-after-congress-bans-government-purchase-of-its-
equipment.  
 171 Id. 
214 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:185 
 
Huawei.”172 This lawsuit has just begun, so we will see the result 
in the coming months, and more likely, years. 
With strained foreign relations with China for many years, An-
imal Science Products, Inc. may have just added fuel to the fire. 
The two countries’ relations may be complicated, but they are en-
during. This trade dispute has no end in sight. One thing is for cer-
tain, whether the leaders want to admit it or not: as it stands today, 
both countries’ economies depend on it each other for success. 
VI. TAKEAWAYS AND REMAINING QUESTIONS 
Although Animal Science Products, Inc. may seem like the 
long-awaited answer to the question of appropriate foreign defer-
ence, this decision does not solve everything. Because this case 
involves a foreign government’s interpretation if its own law, the 
Court’s decision leaves open the question of whether federal courts 
may look beyond an official statement submitted by a foreign 
court. Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the issue of “whether 
Chinese law required the Chinese sellers’ conduct” lingered, 
requiring the Court to remand the case.173 It is indisputable that this 
story is not yet over. As of the date of publication, the Second Cir-
cuit has yet to hear the remand of this case. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court acted wisely by considering the 
circumstances. While the Court must be cautious of becoming too 
protectionist and/or nationalist, at times the policy of the U.S. 
needs to come first. With this decision, the Court has not closed off 
deference to other countries altogether. Instead, it solidified the 
already established notion under FRCP 44.1 that courts may con-
duct their own independent investigations when answering ques-
tions of foreign law that involves a foreign government’s interpre-
tation of its law. The Court maintained its autonomy, did not ig-
nore evidence showing contradictory information, and upheld the 
principles of U.S. antitrust law. 
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